[NAGDU] NFB Vs. Guide Dogs

Cindy Ray cindyray at gmail.com
Sat Dec 3 17:01:44 UTC 2016


Oh yes, things are changing. I think the 1995 article was pivotal in a way.
Also, I don't sentimentalize dogs either and have a problem with the
icebreaker thing. There are times when it could be useful, but it seems that
you don't get to choose what the conversation starter is, and sometimes it
doesn't move on. Of course I suppose we hav major responsibility for that. I
went to a church service once where people constantly asked me the name of
my dog. I finally said my name and that I was under the care of our
Presbytery as a candidate for the ministry of sacrament and word. The
response was, "Oh, that's nice", and people continued wanting to know about
my dog. I did not choose this as my church home. I feel that whether I am
more independent with or without a dog is fluid. Sometimes it seems maybe
so; sometimes it doesn't. I miss using the dog now, but I am going out as
much as ever without him and in about the same way I would ... by myself.
Cindy Lou Ray,
cindyray at gmail.com


-----Original Message-----
From: NAGDU [mailto:nagdu-bounces at nfbnet.org] On Behalf Of Buddy Brannan via
NAGDU
Sent: Saturday, December 3, 2016 10:48 AM
To: NAGDU Mailing List, the National Association of Guide Dog Users
<nagdu at nfbnet.org>
Cc: Buddy Brannan <buddy at brannan.name>
Subject: Re: [NAGDU] NFB Vs. Guide Dogs

That about sums it up. I think there have always been individuals, some in
positions of power, who were not, to put it mildly, fans of guide dogs. Read
the October 1995 issue of the Braille Monitor if you don't believe me. There
was a definite pro-cane bias there, even, I'd say, in the pro guide dog
articles, which, at least in some cases, I didn't think a whole lot of.
There was a lot of sentimentalizing of guide dog use, and 20 years later, I
still don't buy the "guide dog as social icebreaker" thing. Still, I suppose
I'm either just contrary, or else it really did do some good, because that
issue was the final thing that made me decide to give this guide dog thing a
try. My brain works (or doesn't) in mysterious ways, I suppose. Since then,
I've never had a problem with NFB events as regards guide dog use. I think
things are definitely changing, maybe faster in some areas of the country
than in others. 

--
Buddy Brannan, KB5ELV - Erie, PA
Phone: 814-860-3194 
Mobile: 814-431-0962
Email: buddy at brannan.name




> On Dec 3, 2016, at 10:44 AM, Cindy Ray via NAGDU <nagdu at nfbnet.org> wrote:
> 
> In the fifties and the sixties, the use of guide dogs was still very
young.
> The NFB defended the right of blind people to use dogs, but many of us
felt
> that the dog was an inferior mode. I know this because some of the core of
> it was in Iowa. We believed that the cane was the superior method of
> traveling about. Please don't let that start a cane vs. dog discussion
> because that isn't what it means. I'm just stating. There weren't many
> people then who used dogs and also were in the NFB, at least not at
> conventions. When I decided to get a dog in 1989, someone just gasped and
> wondered what had gotten into me, and when I moved back to Iowa someone
said
> that I needed to understand that people weren't going to be making over my
> dog. Things have changed a lot over the past 27 years since I got that
dog,
> but I sometimes still feel remnants of it here. When I was running for
state
> president, it was suggested that a blind person running for state
president
> shouldn't be using a dog. So yeah, it has existed, but the NFB itself did
> not ever have a policy against guide dogs.
> I believe I am representing this correctly. Maybe that is part of the
reason
> I am struggling with whether or not to get another dog--that and the fact
> that I have shortness of breath.
> Cindy Lou Ray
> cindyray at gmail.com
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: NAGDU [mailto:nagdu-bounces at nfbnet.org] On Behalf Of Raul A.
Gallegos
> via NAGDU
> Sent: Saturday, December 3, 2016 7:45 AM
> To: NAGDU Mailing List, the National Association of Guide Dog Users
> <nagdu at nfbnet.org>
> Cc: Raul A. Gallegos <raul at raulgallegos.com>
> Subject: Re: [NAGDU] Pros and Cons of Preferential Treatment
> 
> I never understood the perception that the NFB was against guide dogs.
> I've been a part of this organization in some kind of way, shape, or
> form since the early 90s and I've had a guide dog, cane, both, and many
> combinations. Yet, I've never seen that. Not in Colorado, Kansas,
> Indiana, or any other place. If the NFB was against guide dogs, why
> would there be a guide dog division? Why would some of its board of
> directors themselves be guide dog users? I'm not giving you flack, but
> just pondering because I've never gotten that. What I have seen, is many
> from the NFB promote independent travel skills. This means that just
> because you have a guide dog, it doesn't mean you should let your cane
> skills go by the way side. So, maybe that's the perception, I just don't
> know.
> 
> 
> --
> Raul A. Gallegos
> Assistive Technology Trainer
> 
> On 12/3/2016 7:11 AM, Dan Weiner via NAGDU wrote:
>> And being a founder of the NFB he probably wans't too keen on guide dogs,
>> but oh ewell, yes I know I'll get flack for that--lol
>> 
>> Still all grousing aside, the article certainly has merit.
>> 
>> 
>> Dan
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: NAGDU [mailto:nagdu-bounces at nfbnet.org] On Behalf Of Michael
Hingson
>> via NAGDU
>> Sent: Friday, December 02, 2016 11:30 PM
>> To: 'NAGDU Mailing List,the National Association of Guide Dog Users'
>> Cc: Michael Hingson
>> Subject: [NAGDU] Pros and Cons of Preferential Treatment
>> 
>> Hi,
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> As you are aware Dr. Jacobus tenBroek was the founder of the National
>> Federation of the Blind in 1940. Yes, others were involved, but Dr.
> tenBroek
>> was the impetus and our best ever blindness philosopher. He was a
>> constitutional law scholar, a good speaker and the author of many
speeches
>> and books.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The following is a speech delivered by Dr. tenBroek in 1955. This is
taken
>> from the Braille Monitor, May, 1996. I believe it is pertinent to our
>> discussions about reasonable accommodation and preferential treatment.
> There
>> is another version of this talk entitled "A Preference For Equality", but
> I
>> was unable to find it.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Mike Hingson
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> THE PROS AND CONS OF PREFERENTIAL 
>> TREATMENT OF BLIND PERSONS
>> 
>> by Jacobus tenBroek
>> 
>> An address delivered at the American Association of Workers for the Blind
>> Convention, Quebec, June 1955. First printed in the July 1976, issue of
> the
>> Braille Monitor.
>> 
>> The topic of this discussion immediately suggests the ambivalence, if not
>> the outright hostility, aroused in most of us by the idea of preferential
>> treatment. If it implies unwarranted favors and advantages, as it
> sometimes
>> seems to, how is such treatment to be justified with reference to the
> blind
>> or, for that matter, with reference to any group? If the blind are
normal,
>> as they claim, why do they need to be treated differently? If their
>> objective is really social equality and integration, is it not true that
>> preferential treatment serves to perpetuate special status, with all its
>> connotations of inequality and inferiority? Is there anything about the
>> problems of the blind or of blindness which makes necessary or desirable
>> some form of preferential treatment?
>> 
>> "Any class," wrote one blind man, "which demands special privileges soon
>> finds itself a dependent class," and "the blind of America have developed
> a
>> progressive disease--that of dependency."
>> 
>> We espouse the principle, wrote another blind man, "that the blind are
>> normal and competent people, capable of making their own way, on a basis
> of
>> equality." At the same time we ask "special concessions and privileges on
>> the basis that we are helpless and unequal." "We cannot have our cake and
>> eat it too, and such measures and propaganda stressing the inequality of
> the
>> blind are bound to have a most damaging effect upon our primary goal of
>> equality."
>> 
>> Let us begin our analysis of the pros and cons of preferential treatment
> of
>> the blind at the beginning: that is, by defining the terms used.
>> 
>> Preferential treatment of the blind is treatment which singles out the
> blind
>> for special favors, advantages, or benefits. In short, it is any special
>> treatment. Preferential treatment may be based on an irrational whim,
>> prejudice, or taste--as when one prefers strawberries instead of
>> blueberries, or when it is said "gentlemen prefer blondes." On the other
>> hand, preferential or special treatment may be based on the possession by
>> the group receiving it of some distinctive talents or unique qualities or
>> peculiar needs having a relationship to a proper public policy or
socially
>> desirable objective.
>> 
>> There are no pros, there are only cons, with regard to the preferential
>> treatment of the blind which is founded in irrational whim, prejudice, or
>> taste; and the blind cannot rightly claim, nor do they generally want,
> mere
>> favoritism, public or private, any more than they claim or want the
>> opposite: discriminatory disadvantage, guilt- or shame-motivated
> rejection,
>> kindness-inspired overprotection, or unthinking exclusion. The pros and
> cons
>> of preferential treatment founded in special qualities or needs of the
> group
>> depend in each individual instance upon three factors: (1) upon a
faithful
>> determination and accurate evaluation of the special qualities or needs
of
>> the blind; (2) upon a correct appraisal of the public policy or social
>> objective sought to be achieved by the particular preferential treatment;
>> and (3) upon the adaption of means to ends, that is, upon whether the
> means
>> are proper and there is a close and substantial relationship between the
>> special qualities and needs of the blind, on the one hand, and the policy
> or
>> objective, on the other.
>> 
>> The other term that must be defined is "the blind." Who are the blind?
> What
>> is blindness?
>> 
>> The term blindness in its literal denotative sense means loss of
eyesight;
>> the absence of visual acuity. It refers to a strictly physical condition.
>> The blind, then, are simply those who cannot see. Nothing more, nothing
>> less! The term blindness, however, also has a wider connotative sense. In
>> this sense it refers to restricted social and economic contact,
> opportunity,
>> and activity. To be stripped of eyesight is to be shorn of full-fledged
>> membership in society.
>> 
>> The difference between the denotative and connotative meanings of
> blindness
>> is exactly that between disability and handicap. Disability refers to a
>> physical deprivation; handicap to the social consequences of that
>> deprivation. The distinction may be seen in the fact that there are many
>> disabilities which carry little or no handicap, such as the chronic
>> laryngitis of Andy Devine, the undersize of jockeys, or the oversize of
>> basketball players. Likewise, there are handicaps with no disability,
such
>> as the black skin of American Negroes or the religion of the Jews in Nazi
>> Germany. Disability is properly the concern of medical science. We can do
>> little about the physical fact of blindness except to cure it or live
with
>> it. But it is not blindness alone that we live with. We live with other
>> people, which is to say we live in society. It is society which creates
> and
>> imposes the handicap of blindness, for it consists of the misconceptions
> of
>> the sighted about the nature of the physical disability. The principal
>> misconception, the one that embodies and epitomizes all the rest, is that
>> blindness means helplessness--social and economic incapacity; the
>> destruction of the productive powers; the obliteration of the ability to
>> contribute to or benefit from normal community participation; in short,
> the
>> lingering image of the helpless blind man.
>> 
>> Three comments about the social handicap of blindness are particularly in
>> order: (1) To place responsibility for it upon the sighted is not to
speak
>> in terms of blame or recrimination. Far from it! The misconceptions are
>> sanctioned by a society motivated mainly by benevolence, wishing above
all
>> else to be kind and helpful. (2) Wherever, as happens with increasing
>> frequency, an individual blind person breaks through the social barriers,
>> his success is likely to be attributed to his possession of special
genius
>> or compensatory powers (either superhuman or supernatural) which leave
the
>> overall image of blindness intact. (3) Public attitudes about the blind
>> inevitably become the attitudes of the blind. The blind see themselves as
>> others see them. They accept the public view of their limitations and
thus
>> do much to make them a reality.
>> 
>> Most people exaggerate the physical and underemphasize the social aspect
> of
>> blindness. Our distinguished and able chairman, Father Carroll, has
> defined
>> blindness in terms of twenty lacks and losses. I am one of Father
> Carroll's
>> numerous admirers. But I admire him more for his willingness to prepare a
>> list than for the list he has prepared. It seems to me that he falls prey
> to
>> the common fallacy. Note what a large percentage of the items on the list
>> refers to the physical fact of blindness and its immediate physical and
>> personal consequences; what a small percentage refers to the broadly
> social.
>> What may be known hereafter as Father Carroll's Lacks and Losses reads as
>> follows: (1) loss of physical integrity; (2) loss of confidence in the
>> remaining senses; (3) loss of reality contact; (4) loss of visual
>> background; (5) loss of "light"; (6) loss of mobility; (7) loss of visual
>> perception: beautiful; (8) loss of visual perception: pleasurable; (9)
> loss
>> of ease of written communication; (10) loss of ease of spoken
> communication;
>> (11) loss of means for informational progress; (12) loss of recreation;
> (13)
>> loss of technique, daily living; (14) loss of career: vocation, goal, job
>> opportunity; (15) loss of financial security; (16) loss of personal
>> independence; (17) loss of social adequacy; (18) loss of obscurity,
>> anonymity; (19) loss of self-esteem; (20) loss of total personality
>> organization.
>> 
>> I would not have you believe that I underassess the importance of the
>> physical disability. Without sight the range of perception is narrowed.
>> Objects which can be seen from afar must be near at hand to be
discernible
>> by other senses. And the blind person who has not scuffed his shins on
>> low-lying implements and toys carelessly left on the sidewalk or stumbled
>> over a curb, or bumped his head on an overhanging awning or branch has
> never
>> left his armchair. These are undeniably embarrassing or uncomfortable
>> experiences; but they are properly to be classified as minor annoyances
or
>> distractive nuisances, like shaving in the morning or removing your glass
>> eyes at night. In my experience, blind people who are willing to move and
>> put one foot out in front of the other always somehow get where they want
> to
>> go.
>> 
>> In any event, the main point is that the real affliction of blindness is
> not
>> the physical disability or its immediate consequences but the social
>> handicap. It therefore becomes most important to analyze the precise
> nature
>> of the handicap. Of what does it consist? What are the elements which
>> compose it? What does it mean to be excluded from society? What are the
>> rights of membership of which the blind are thus deprived?
>> 
>> To answer these questions, one must identify the main features of
American
>> society, for it is denial of participation in these which constitutes the
>> handicap of blindness. The process of answering the questions therefore
is
>> one of resurveying American social and political thought and
> constitutional
>> ideals, one of restating the principles, doctrines, and concepts that are
>> contained therein. 
>> 
>> The task of restating American social and political assumptions and goals
> is
>> complicated by a number of facts and factors. Major American social and
>> political principles, such as the dignity of the individual, liberty,
>> equality, and private property, are so intermingled and overlapping that
> it
>> is difficult to separate any one of them for single treatment.
>> 
>> Emphasis on the various elements has shifted at different periods in our
>> history, in the documents which have embodied and expressed different
>> movements, forces, and times, and among the prominent political writers
> and
>> speakers. Equality was the dominant note in the Declaration of
> Independence.
>> Property assumed relatively a stronger position in the Constitution.
> During
>> the nineteenth century, when fortune and geography gave the nation
> military
>> safety and free land and the open frontier gave individuals a sense of
>> economic safety, security was assumed and liberty was elevated into a
>> primary position. Today, as Ralph Henry Gabriel writes, "When the
>> traditional foundations of culture crumble,...when government by law
gives
>> way to government by irresponsible force, the preoccupation with liberty
> as
>> an end in itself is replaced by a new search for security, mental,
social,
>> economic, and even physical."1
>> 
>> Sometimes, indeed, going far beyond mere shifts in emphasis, the elements
>> are presented as irreconcilably contradictory. Read for example this
> passage
>> from William Graham Sumner: "Let it be understood that we cannot go
> outside
>> this alternative: liberty, inequality, survival of the fittest;
> non-liberty,
>> equality, survival of the unfittest. The former carries society upwards
> and
>> favors all of its best members; the latter carries society downwards and
>> favors all its worst members."2
>> 
>> Finally, the task of stating American social and political principles is
>> made difficult by the fact that they are not fixed and immutable, as the
>> laws of the Medes and the Persians were reputed to be. To the extent that
>> they are a living reality in a developing democracy, they are constantly
>> growing, maturing, and changing. Every generation, every decade is a
>> formative period in the constitutional life of the nation. In our
> generation
>> the creative interpretation and application of American social and
> political
>> principles in the sphere of international organization and in the social
> and
>> economic sphere are in process.
>> 
>> Yet, despite these difficulties in stating them, the major elements in
the
>> set of widely accepted and persistently enduring political principles and
>> social ethics are identifiable and subject to description and
>> characterization. The "easily remembered" formulations can be found in
the
>> landmark documents of our history. These documents not only express and
>> embody movements and periods of the past but are as well basic forces of
>> government in the present and for the future. They include the
Declaration
>> of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, the Preamble to the United
> States
>> Constitution, the state constitutions, the Civil War amendments to the
>> United States Constitution, and the more famous pronouncements of the
> United
>> States Supreme Court.
>> 
>> (1) Liberty. In American political thought, liberty has many aspects and
>> sources. It is both positive and negative. It is political, economic,
>> personal, and, in a broad sense, social. It is founded by some in
>> positivism; by others in natural law; by still others in moral law. It
> sets
>> in equilibrium constitutionalism and democracy. In part liberty consists
> in
>> protection against the will of the majority, no matter how regularly
>> manifested and how lacking in oppressiveness or arbitrariness. In this
>> aspect it is embodied in an array of restraints on governmental action
and
>> the organized power of society. The existence of a constitutionally
> arranged
>> governmental structure and distribution of powers, in fact the existence
> of
>> a constitution at all, implies a system of limited government.
>> 
>> The Constitution, too, contains many explicit prohibitions on government.
>> Though some exist elsewhere in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and
> the
>> other amendments are, of course, a catalogue of these. Among them are the
>> protection given life, liberty, and property, the requirement of
> established
>> and regular procedures by government, and the guarantee of immunity from
>> unreasonable intrusions into the privacy of one's person, house, papers,
> and
>> effects. The many safeguards against improper conviction for crime refer
> not
>> only to the technical aspects of criminal justice, but bespeak the basic
>> right of personal freedom: i.e., freedom to move about as one pleases and
> to
>> be not subject to surveillance and custodialization by the agents of the
>> state. Likewise, freedom from slavery and peonage is decreed, implying
not
>> only self-ownership but free labor and the right to the rewards of labor.
>> 
>> A dominant part of American social and political thought has always been
a
>> notion that these rights, thus fixed in the Constitution, are the
>> indivestible possessions of individuals even when not so guaranteed.
> Whether
>> derived from natural law, moral law, higher law, or various other
concepts
>> about the fundamental nature of man and society, this notion has found
>> constant expression throughout our history. Its standard formulation is
in
>> the Declaration of Independence: "[T]hat [men] are endowed by their
> Creator
>> with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and
> the
>> pursuit of happiness." These rights governments were instituted to secure
>> and protect, not to create and confer.3
>> 
>> The concept that rights which are regarded as very important are somehow
>> natural rights or derive from a higher law results from a philosophic
view
>> which has lost much of its persuasion and support in recent decades. The
>> Founding Fathers, however, and most American statesmen down through the
>> Civil War period, made it their starting point. Natural rights thus
became
>> inextricably woven into the fabric of American social and political
> thought
>> and popular belief. They lurk just below the surface of many of our state
>> papers, judicial pronouncements, and political orations of today. Of
those
>> Americans who do not accept this particular philosophical concept, most
>> still insist upon the great importance and basic character of the rights
>> proclaimed.
>> 
>> So far I have spoken of the constitutional side of constitutional
> democracy.
>> The democracy side is a positive aspect of liberty. It has to do with the
>> individual's right to participate in government, in the determination of
>> social direction and policy. Its foundation is the doctrine of popular
>> sovereignty and the consent of the governed. Its implementations are the
>> right of suffrage, the right to seek and hold office, and the right of
the
>> majority to rule. Its indispensable conditions are freedom of speech,
> press,
>> and assembly.4
>> 
>> Liberty is positive in another phase besides that of the co-sovereignty
of
>> citizens of a republic. Government is responsible for the protection of
> the
>> rights of the individual. This cannot be wholly achieved by the
government
>> itself refraining from invading them. It must prevent others from
invading
>> them. It must eliminate and control the conditions which nullify them or
>> make their exercise impossible. It must foster, promote, establish, and
>> maintain the conditions which nullify them or make their exercise
>> impossible. It must foster, promote, establish, and maintain the
> conditions
>> which make their exercise possible and significant. This is especially
> true
>> if the right is active rather than passive; if it involves doing and not
>> just being; acquiring and not just having; speaking and not just
> listening.
>> Congress, as Webster declared in his famous debate with Hayne, is under
an
>> obligation to exercise the powers delegated to it in the Constitution for
>> the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth in the Preamble of the
>> Constitution--to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide
>> for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
>> blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. . . ."5
>> 
>> Men have a right to life, personal freedom, and personal security. They
> have
>> the right to marry, have and rear children, and maintain a home.6 They
> have
>> a right, so far as government can assure it, to that fair opportunity to
>> earn a livelihood which will make these other rights possible and
>> significant.7 Men may not be bound to the place of their poverty and
>> misfortune; they may move freely about the country in search of new
>> opportunity.8 They have a right freely to choose their fields of
endeavor,
>> unhindered by arbitrary, artificial, and man-made impediments.9 They have
> a
>> right to enter the common trades, callings, and occupations of the
>> community. They have the right, if they are free, to manage their own
>> affairs as they see fit, unless and until there is interference with the
>> equal rights of others to manage their affairs or there is injury to the
>> welfare of the community.
>> 
>> "It is not enough," wrote the President's Committee on Civil Rights in
> 1947,
>> "that full and equal membership in society entitles the individual to an
>> equal voice in the control of his government; it must also give him the
>> right to enjoy the benefits of society and to contribute to its progress.
> .
>> . . Without this equality of opportunity, the individual is deprived of
> the
>> chance to develop his potentialities and to share the fruits of society.
> The
>> group also suffers through the loss of the contributions which might have
>> been made by persons excluded from the main channels of social and
> economic
>> activity."
>> 
>> (2) The Dignity of Man. Deeply imbedded in this concept of liberty is a
>> democratic view of the individual, of his role in society, relation to
the
>> state, essential dignity and worth. It is the individual who possesses
>> rights which are fundamental and inalienable. He is at the beginning and
> the
>> end of the state. He organizes it and gives it authority. Its powers are
>> conferred to protect his rights and to assure the conditions necessary
for
>> their maximum expression. The state exists for his benefit, not he for
> its.
>> "In democratic society," wrote Charles Merriam, "regard for the dignity
of
>> man stands behind the throne of public order, a constant reminder of the
>> need for liberty and justice as well as order, a constant plea that the
>> human personality shall not be forgotten in the multiplications of laws,
> in
>> the ramifications of administration, or in the antiquarianism of formal
>> justice."10
>> 
>> Democracy breathes respect for all men and seeks to preserve their
>> individuality and autonomy. This spirit is violated wherever men are
>> alienated or sheltered from the mainstream, not only in the overt
gestures
>> of rejection but in the sentimental embrace of patronage and protection.
>> Humanity is degraded and individuality disparaged by treatment of the
> person
>> as a unit in a category determined by irrelevant traits, defined and
>> measured not in unique terms of personal character and achievement but in
>> the stereotype terms of physical or national or racial difference.
>> 
>> (3) The Rights of Property and to Contract. The rights to property and to
>> contract have likewise been regarded as fundamental in the American
> system.
>> The right to property along with life and liberty is listed as one of the
>> three great rights of all free men in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta. It
>> appears thus also in the American state constitutions, early and late, in
>> the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in the United States Constitution,
>> Amendments V and XIV, and elsewhere.11
>> 
>> The rights to liberty, property, and contract are interlocking if not
>> interchangeable concepts. The right to contract is sometimes stated as an
>> incident to the right to property; sometimes as an independent aspect of
>> liberty. Property is described by some as sufficiently broad to
> incorporate
>> all other rights of individuals, including liberty; and liberty is often
>> regarded by others as broad enough to encompass the right to acquire,
use,
>> and enjoy property. The three rights of liberty, property, and contract
> are
>> thus intimately associated in American thinking.12
>> 
>> Property and contract rights are not unlimited but, on the contrary, are
>> subject to public control in the public interest. They may be abridged
> and,
>> in some cases, destroyed altogether, if that is necessary to protect the
>> community against injury or danger in any form, against fraud or vice or
>> economic oppression or serious public inconvenience or depression or
other
>> disasters. The power to control is coextensive with the social and
> economic
>> activities of men. It finds its limit in the nature of the acts forbidden
> or
>> required and its justification in the direct relation of these acts to
the
>> public welfare or to the equal property rights of others.
>> 
>> The power of the state over property and contract rights, however, is not
>> merely negative or incidental to the power to legislate for the health,
>> safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. The basic character
> of
>> the right and the purpose of government regarding it cannot be minimized
> or
>> ignored. That purpose, as in the case of liberty, is to protect and
>> preserve, maintain, and nurture the right. The power to regulate the use
> of
>> property and contract, consequently, may not, save in very rare and
> special
>> circumstances, be converted into the power directly to take property and
>> contract rights. And in discharging its primary and affirmative duty with
>> respect to these rights, the state must keep constantly in view the
>> essential values of private property in our system. It is a central
factor
>> in the organization of society. It is an impelling source of motivation.
> It
>> is a principal incentive for productive activity. It is a reward for
labor
>> and contribution. It is at once the object of individual enterprise and
>> success and the means of achieving success. And contract is the form of
>> expression and governing instrument, not only of most business activity,
> but
>> as well of most of the transactions of daily life.
>> 
>> (4) Equality. Only second to liberty itself in our history has been the
>> ideal of equality. In fact, equality has always conditioned liberty and
>> determined its character just as liberty has always conditioned equality
> and
>> determined its character. In the Declaration of Independence, the first
of
>> the "self-evident truths" is that all men are created equal; and all men
> are
>> equally "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,"
"among
>> which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
>> 
>> Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1835, described equality in America as "the
>> fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived and the central
>> point at which all my observations constantly terminated." In his view it
>> gave "a peculiar direction to public opinion and peculiar tenor to the
> laws;
>> it imparts new maxims to the governing authorities and peculiar habits to
>> the governed." It "extends far beyond the political character and the
laws
>> of the country, and...has no less effect on civil society than on the
>> government; it creates opinions, gives birth to new sentiments, founds
> novel
>> customs, and modifies whatever it does not produce."13
>> 
>> Equality, even more than liberty, stood in the forefront of the historic
>> struggle in the nation to abolish property in man and the institution of
>> slavery; and, along with liberty, emerged in the Civil War amendments to
> the
>> Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment, freeing men from slavery and
>> nationalizing the right of freedom, nationally guaranteed what slavery
>> denied: the equal right of all to enjoy protection in those natural
rights
>> which constitute freedom. The Fourteenth Amendment, in the three
redundant
>> clauses of Section 1, re-embodied these same objectives and added an
>> explicit guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, thereby adding
>> another confirmatory reference to the self-evident truth that all men are
>> created equal and are equally entitled to the protection of government in
>> the enjoyment of their natural and inalienable rights.14
>> 
>> Like liberty, equality has many phases. One of them relates to the
> doctrine
>> of proper classification. The laws must be aimed at the achievement of a
>> public and constitutional purpose. They may not be motivated by hatred,
>> vengeance, favoritism, or private gain. Legislation framed with a
>> discriminatory purpose, manifesting "an evil eye and an unequal hand,"
>> contains an elementary antagonism to the idea of the equality of men.
Once
>> legislation is endowed with a public and constitutional purpose, it still
>> must meet other tests. Because there are real differences among men,
>> regulation would be altogether ineffective if it had to apply to all or
>> none. The law must therefore be selective. But to be equal, it must treat
>> all those similarly situated alike. The differences between men that
>> underlie selection must be real differences and must bear an intimate
>> relationship to the purpose of the law and valid social goals. All other
>> differences are irrelevant and must be ignored. "Class Legislation," said
>> Justice Field in summing up this doctrine, "discriminating against some
> and
>> favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a
>> public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of
its
>> operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within
> the
>> amendment."15
>> 
>> Another phase of the idea of equality is the rule of law. If all men are
>> created equal and equally possess certain rights, and if governments are
>> instituted to secure and maintain those rights, and men therefore are
>> equally entitled to such protection, the protection can only be afforded
> by
>> uniform rule, that is, by law. One way of putting this is the expression:
>> "Equality before the Law." Another way is in the celebrated words of the
>> Massachusetts Bill of Rights: "That the government of the Commonwealth
may
>> be a government of laws and not of men." Thus, in this aspect, the
> doctrine
>> of equality is in effect a command that the government act by established
>> and regular procedures and by uniform rules. It is a command that the
> purely
>> personal, arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical be reduced and eliminated
>> from the exercise of power. It is a command that the rules be fixed and
>> announced in advance in a way which will make them freely and publicly
>> available. It is a requirement of a degree of certainty and
predictability
>> in government action and of a system of rights growing out of uniform
> rules.
>> It is finally an order that administrators as well as legislators act
> within
>> these confines.
>> 
>> In still another phase, equality is not negative and procedural but
> positive
>> and substantial. Anatole France referred to "the majestic equality of the
>> laws which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg
> in
>> the streets, and to steal their bread." But the demands of equality are
> not
>> met by the equal treatment which results from the absence of the laws or
>> from the indiscriminate application of the laws to those who are
>> dissimilarly situated. Moreover, the demands of equality are not
exhausted
>> by the doctrine of classification and the rule of law. The equal
> protection
>> of the laws refers to the quality of the laws as well as to the mechanics
> of
>> their operation. The reign of equal laws involves as well the reign of
> just
>> laws, and the maintenance of equality in the enjoyment of rights is at
the
>> heart of the system of justice. Equality thus must be the very purpose of
>> governmental action and policy as well as a test and measure of its
means.
>> It must "give direction to public opinions," determine the "tenor of the
>> laws," impart "maxims to the governing authorities," and modify "whatever
> it
>> does not produce."
>> 
>> Particularly is the government under a duty to guarantee equality of
>> opportunity. Without that, freedom itself cannot last and becomes an
>> illusion. The only aristocracy that a system founded upon equality can
>> tolerate is an aristocracy of personal merit and achievement. Uniformity
> and
>> regimentation, on the one hand, and status, influence, and power based on
>> birth, social position, or inheritance, on the other hand, are equally
>> incompatible with equality. Equality of all men presupposes respect for
> the
>> rights of others. In a society of equals, therefore, men are free to be
>> different. All limitations on opportunity, all restrictions on the
>> individual based on irrelevant differences of race, color, religion,
>> national origin, sex, and the like, are in conflict with equality and
must
>> be removed and forbidden. Access to the mainstreams of community life,
the
>> aspirations and achievements of each member of society, are to be limited
>> only by the skills, energy, talents, and ability he brings to the
>> opportunities equally open to all Americans.
>> 
>> From what I have said so far, a number of propositions emerge:
>> 
>> (1) Preferential treatment of the blind based on favoritism, privilege,
>> whim, prejudice, patronage, pity, charity, self-interest of others, or
>> feelings of like or dislike cannot be justified and indeed does a great
> deal
>> of harm. On the other hand, preferential treatment which takes account of
>> the special qualities or needs of the blind or aspects of their situation
>> not shared by others, which is aimed at a desirable social objective and
>> which employs proper means properly adapted to this purpose, is not only
>> justifiable preferential treatment but is treatment which should be at
the
>> foundation of all public and private policy toward the blind.
>> 
>> (2) Blindness has a dual aspect: the physical and the social. The first
is
>> the disability; the second is the handicap. Treatment of the disability
is
> a
>> medical task. Overcoming the handicap is the function of rehabilitation.
>> 
>> (3) The handicap consists mainly of the misconceptions of the sighted
> about
>> the physical disability which result in social exclusion. In all but the
>> physical sense, and even to some extent in that, it consists of a loss of
>> full membership in society; a denial to the blind of the rights and goals
>> which others share--liberty, equality, property, dignity.
>> 
>> (4) Overcoming the handicap of blindness, therefore, means removing the
>> bars, exclusion, and denials of which the handicap consists: conferring
on
>> the blind the title deeds of social freedom and membership; the rights of
>> liberty, equality, property, and dignity; in short, their reintegration
> into
>> society.
>> 
>> (5) Programs which address themselves to this purpose or which move in
> this
>> direction, while they necessarily involve preferential treatment, meet
all
>> the tests and standards set up for good policy. Such special arrangements
>> might better go by the name of equal treatment. Indeed, to lift from the
>> backs of the blind the special, heavy, and unnecessary burdens which
> society
>> has caused them to bear and to call this preferential treatment can
hardly
>> be regarded as anything but the bitterest irony. Programs which move in
> the
>> opposite direction, which accept and build upon the public misconceptions
>> about the nature of the physical disability, which presuppose the
> incapacity
>> and abnormality of the blind, and which institutionalize that
> presupposition
>> in segregation and custodialization--all programs, in other words, which
>> continue or intensify social exclusion or which are motivated by
> patronage,
>> charity, whim, prejudice, or self-interest--involve preferential or
> special
>> treatment which increases the handicap. They perpetuate the very
attitudes
>> and conditions which they should be designed to prevent.
>> 
>> (6) Preferential treatment is also justified which: (a) tends to
> ameliorate
>> the immediate physical consequences of the physical disability of
> blindness;
>> or (b) pending the day when integration has been achieved, mitigates the
>> financial and other consequences of social exclusion or offsets the
>> disadvantage resulting therefrom by means which do not further entrench
> the
>> public misconception or which do so as little as possible.
>> 
>> (7) To be consistent with the standards dictated by the basic principles
> of
>> our social, political, and constitutional system, programs for the blind
>> must:
>> 
>> (a) Allow the blind to manage their own personal affairs and proceed on
> the
>> assumption that they are capable of doing so.
>> 
>> (b) Not only permit the blind, but stimulate and encourage them to
develop
>> their potentialities, share in the fruits of society, and contribute to
> its
>> work and progress.
>> 
>> (c) And to do this, not only permit, but stimulate and encourage the
blind
>> to work, to engage in individual enterprise, to exercise free judgment
and
>> free movement in the search for opportunity, freely to choose their
fields
>> of endeavor and to enter the common callings, trades, occupations, and
>> professions of the community.
>> 
>> (d) To stimulate and encourage the blind to do these things by relying on
>> the normal incentives, principal among which are financial remuneration
> and
>> the improvement of one's economic lot and social status.
>> 
>> (e) Permit, stimulate, and encourage the blind to acquire, enjoy, and use
>> property (real and personal), not just for immediate consumption
purposes,
>> but as a motivational source of endeavor and a means of economic
>> improvement.
>> 
>> (f) Protect the essential dignity of the individual: by recognizing the
>> worth of the human personality and treating it as a community asset
rather
>> than a community liability; by supplying aids and services without
>> humiliation, without undue intrusion into the privacy of the recipient,
>> without imposing upon him the badges and indicia of a needy and special
>> status, without subjecting him to the personal judgments of social
workers
>> influenced by humanity, charity, approval, or other emotions; by making
>> possible a standard and circumstance of living not conspicuously
different
>> from that enjoyed by the rest of the community; by leaving recipients
free
>> to make their own decisions as to spending, living arrangements, and
>> personal matters.
>> 
>> (g) If the demands of equality are to be met, public financial aid must
be
>> granted as a matter of right, the element of personal discretion
exercised
>> by administrators and welfare workers must be eliminated, the amount and
>> conditions of the aid must be specified in uniform rules made accessible
> to
>> recipients and prospective recipients and sufficiently exact so that
>> recipients may determine to what they are entitled and what their
>> responsibilities are. Legislative and administrative standards must be
>> established which are uniformly applied, which treat all welfare
> recipients
>> alike who are similarly situated with respect to a valid purpose of the
>> welfare law, and which vary the amount and the condition of the grant
when
>> there are real differences among recipients in terms of their
relationship
>> to the welfare program. Finally, equality requires--as does liberty, the
>> dignity of the individual, and the essential notion of property--that the
>> purpose of the welfare law be opportunity as well as security. Relief
> rolls
>> should provide relief; but they must also provide the means of escape
from
>> them. Reintegration into society through open and equal access to the
>> mainstream of community productive activity must be an object of welfare
> law
>> and a measure of its adaptation if the fundamental political and
>> constitutional principles of our system are to be honored in the fact as
>> well as held out in the promise.
>> 
>> Measured by these standards, evaluated in the light of these
> considerations,
>> how do our programs and provisions for the blind prove out? The answer
> must
>> be mixed. Some programs are well adapted to these principles; others
> poorly;
>> and still others are in flat contradiction of them. Unfortunately, some
of
>> the most important programs fall into the latter two categories.
>> 
>> The rapidly growing and recently created system of orientation and
>> adjustment centers--focusing on mobility training, personal care,
>> prevocational manual skills, and the development of attitudes which make
>> these other activities possible and fruitful--are properly oriented and
>> adjusted to reduce the immediate physical consequences of the disability
> of
>> blindness, to uproot the conviction of incompetence, and to impart
>> self-confidence, hope, and a zest for living.
>> 
>> The home teacher system, though hampered by the need to deal with the
> blind
>> person in his home and then only in occasional short visits,
substantially
>> moves in the same direction as the orientation center. It is most
> effective
>> when used as a case-finder for the center and otherwise works in close
>> collaboration with it. It is least effective when it emphasizes
handicraft
>> as mere busy work or when it teaches Braille to clients who will never
> have
>> any use for it.
>> 
>> White cane laws, now enacted in almost all the states, by giving the
blind
> a
>> legal position in traffic and moderating the discriminatory harshness of
> the
>> contributory negligence rule, make meaningful for the blind the human and
>> constitutional right of free movement, just as the cane itself makes more
>> meaningful the physical capacity of free movement.
>> 
>> What about good vision requirements established in many laws and
> regulations
>> dealing with jobs, licenses, and the like? Some of these are, of course,
>> perfectly in order. Where sight is indispensable to the performance of
the
>> task- -as in hunting with a gun, driving a truck, or working as a
>> photographer of wildlife for the National Park Service--the blind are
>> legitimately excluded. Where sight is not indispensable, as is the case
in
>> thousands of jobs public and private from which the blind are now
>> barred--the continued exclusion of the blind can have no special
>> justification. In many of these cases the bars remain up because those
who
>> tend them have only their misconceptions to guide them.
>> 
>> Laws and regulations giving preference to blind persons with respect to
> jobs
>> are not mere favoritism if they are based on the special qualifications
of
>> the blind to perform the tasks assigned. This is clearly so when the
blind
>> are called upon to work in or administer programs affecting the blind. In
>> that circumstance blindness is an enabling asset endowing the worker with
>> special knowledge, experience, and the confidence of his clients which
>> probably cannot be secured in any other way than by being blind. Of
course
>> this enabling asset should be given determinative weight only when other
>> things are equal. For the blind to be given preference in other
situations
>> in which blindness does not contribute to the ability to do the work
would
>> be as unjustifiable as to discriminate against the blind in jobs in which
>> blindness does not detract from the ability to do the work.
>> 
>> What about vending stands for which the blind are given rent-free
> locations
>> on public property, in connection with the establishment of which they
are
>> given a preference and protection against vending machine competition,
and
>> with respect to the operation of which blindness is not an enabling
asset?
>> These special arrangements will not withstand merited criticism once the
>> blind have achieved a footing of complete economic equality. Until that
> time
>> arrives, however, the vending stand program is preferential treatment
> which
>> is justified as a small offset to almost universal economic
discrimination
>> against the blind; and one in which bona fide jobs are provided for
>> qualified blind workers at comparatively negligible cost to the public;
> and
>> one in which the blind are presented to the public in an aspect of
>> competence and normality.
>> 
>> If the management of the vending stand programs is to be consistent with
> the
>> standards above discussed, it must keep supervision and control at an
>> absolute minimum; allow the operator to purchase his stand and equipment
>> with only an option to repurchase by the public; give the operator
> complete
>> independence in the management of his business affairs, retaining only
the
>> power to revoke the license if the operator proves incompetent or becomes
>> publicly obnoxious; protect the operator's profits against confiscation
> for
>> the support of supervisory personnel or submarginal stands which the
>> administrators have mistakenly established in unprofitable locations. The
>> control system, on the contrary, reflects the custodial attitude toward
> the
>> role and the abilities of the blind, a conviction that the blind are
>> incapable of running their own business and incompetent to lead their own
>> lives.
>> 
>> Let us turn next to public assistance. Liberty in the direction of one's
>> affairs, the whole basic principle of self-management, is violated by the
>> means test. Under it, the individual recipient soon loses control of his
>> daily activities and the whole course and direction of his life. The
>> capacity for self-direction presently atrophies and drops away. With each
>> new item budgeted or eliminated, with each new resource tracked down and
>> evaluated, the social worker's influence increases. This is an inevitable
>> concomitant of the means test. It results from the nature and extent of
> the
>> system. It is bred and nourished by the provisions of the statutes and
the
>> rules issued under them. It is in the flexible joints of the cumbersome
>> machinery. It is in the detail and intimacy of the investigation. It is
in
>> the inescapable confinements of the budget. It is in the idleness,
>> defeatism, and waning spirit of the recipient. Whatever the social
> worker's
>> wishes and intentions, her hand becomes the agency of direction in his
>> affairs. The "concern of assistance with the whole range of income,"
wrote
>> Karl DeSchweinitz, "always contains a threat to the freedom of the
>> individual. Even when there is no conscious intent to dictate behavior to
>> the beneficiary, the pervasive power of money dispensed under the means
> test
>> may cause the slightest suggestion to have the effects of compulsion.
> `Whose
>> bread I eat, his song I sing.'"16
>> 
>> Not only is liberty violated by the means test, but so also are dignity
> and
>> equality--and for many of the same reasons. Dignity is jeopardized by the
>> initial financial investigation; by the searching inquiry into every
>> intimate detail of need, living habits, family relations; by the setting
> up
>> of a detailed budget of expenditures subject to repeated examination and
>> review; by the continuously implied and often explicit threat that if
>> behavior is uncooperative or unapproved, aid will be reduced or stopped,
> by
>> the wholesale substitution of agency and social worker controls for the
>> personal direction of personal affairs; by the unwarrantable intrusions
> into
>> privacy involved in each of the foregoing and the galling humiliation of
> the
>> whole process; and, finally, by the constant tendency of the whole system
> to
>> push living standards down below a minimum of decency and health.
>> 
>> The excessive individualization of the whole design and process of means
>> test aid is fundamentally antithetical to the idea of equality. A system
>> which makes so much depend upon a minute examination of every aspect of
> the
>> individual's situation necessarily involves personalized judgments by
>> officials and invites arbitrary and whimsical exercises of power,
prevents
>> the enforcement of a uniform rule even when the legislative provisions
and
>> administrative regulations are detailed and exact, renders it impossible
> for
>> the recipient himself to determine to what he is entitled, constitutes
the
>> very thing intended to be prevented by the idea of "a government of laws
> and
>> not of men," and flies in the face of basic requirements of proper
>> classification. Since with respect to the purposes of public assistance
> law
>> most individuals are parts of groups standing in the same relationship,
>> those who are similarly situated are not treated alike and real
> differences
>> are frequently disregarded.
>> 
>> Means test aid also violates the notion of individual opportunity, access
> to
>> the mainstream of community productive activity, and normal incentives.
>> Since means test aid requires that all income and resources of the
> recipient
>> be applied to meet his current needs and since the public assistance
grant
>> is reduced by the amount of any such available income or resources, the
>> usual financial motive for effort and endeavor is removed from the
> recipient
>> unless the recipient can gain enough and with sufficient certainty to be
>> independent of the relief rolls.
>> 
>> Granting aid as a matter of right contradicts practically all of the
>> tendencies inherent in the means test and produces a system more
consonant
>> with the political and constitutional assumptions and goals of American
>> democracy.
>> 
>> Aid as a matter of right requires the establishment of fixed and uniform
>> rules specifying the terms and conditions of the grant. Thus the
principal
>> features of the system must be laid down by the legislature. This
> contrasts
>> with the means test variable grant, based on individual need individually
>> determined by the administrative agency under discretionary authority
>> conferred by the legislature. Those who are similarly situated are
> therefore
>> necessarily treated alike and under standards comparable with those
>> governing assistance to other groups in the community.
>> 
>> Granting aid as a matter of right protects the liberty of the individual
> to
>> manage his own affairs and conduct his daily life free of authoritarian
>> controls and caseworker supervision. It protects the dignity of the
>> individual. He is treated as a member of a class entitled to be dealt
with
>> in a manner determined by law, not by individualized administrative
>> discretion. The occasion is eliminated for invasion of the individual's
>> privacy, supervision of his personal behavior, and humiliating probing
> into
>> the intimacies of his life; and a seminal principle is established which
>> stands as a barrier to all such actions.
>> 
>> Finally, rehabilitation. The primary task of vocational rehabilitation,
as
> I
>> have said, is the overcoming of the social handicap--not the physical
>> condition. It consists in the creation of an environment within society,
>> within public programs, and within the blind themselves, which will be in
>> the fullest sense conducive to normal livelihood and normal life. It
>> involves opening up the channels of social participation, that is,
> enabling
>> the blind to enjoy the benefits of socially determined standards of
> liberty,
>> equality, property, and dignity. Its time-tested tools are vocational
>> orientation, vocational training, counseling, and guidance which
> stimulates
>> and opens up horizons--and finally, of course, placement in remunerative
>> employment in the common callings, trades, pursuits, and professions of
> the
>> community.
>> 
>> In the proper conceptions of its function as well as in the use of these
>> time-tested tools, the vocational rehabilitation program of the United
>> States must in large measure be pronounced a failure. The hope and
>> opportunity are to be measured in miles; the actual accomplishment must
be
>> measured in inches.
>> 
>> Rehabilitation so far as the individual rehabilitant is concerned is a
>> complex process in which mental and emotional elements are predominant.
It
>> involves myriad adaptations not merely physical in nature but social and
>> psychological. In effect, the entire personality must undergo
>> reconstruction; the blind person's conviction of his own incompetence,
>> accepted from the public misconception, must be uprooted; a rebirth, a
new
>> act of creation must be wrought. In this process ambition, hope, and
>> self-reliance are essential ingredients. Consequently, rehabilitation by
> the
>> command of the counselor or submission to his attitudes and preferences
or
>> by the coercion which results from conditioning public assistance upon it
> is
>> a contradiction. It is therefore futile. It is as futile as ordering a
>> person to restore his emotional balance while adding to the very factors
>> which cause the unbalance.
>> 
>> Since the objective of rehabilitation is restoration to a normal useful
> role
>> in society, the standards of success are in large measure culturally
>> determined. The rehabilitated person, thus, is one for whom the
> assumptions
>> and goals of the community have become as significant as for others, who
> has
>> in fact achieved equal opportunity to enter the calling of his choice, to
>> acquire, use, and dispose of property, to exercise the right of personal
>> independence, and to operate on the other assumptions and principles
> before
>> listed. Just as the habits of freedom are not learned by experiencing
>> slavery, so ambition is not learned by destitution, self-management by
>> authoritarian controls, incentive by denying the hope of gain, or
>> self-respect by second-class citizenship. Rehabilitation by command or
>> coercion cultivates the very traits which frustrate and prevent
>> rehabilitation. A rehabilitation program which continually impresses upon
>> the client a sense of his helplessness and dependency; which enshrouds
him
>> in an atmosphere of disbelief, doubt, and defeatism; and which exhibits
>> attitudes of guardianship and custodialism must inevitably sap the fibre
> of
>> self-reliance, undermine hope, deter self-improvement, and destroy the
> very
>> initiative which is indispensable to rehabilitation.
>> 
>> Rehabilitation by stimulation, by opening up new horizons, by assisting
> the
>> client in the achievement of goals of his own choice, by incentives
>> carefully planned to encourage productive activity by the expectation of
>> normal rewards--retention of earnings, improvement of standards of
living,
>> accumulation of real and personal property--places rehabilitative effort
> in
>> conformity with the political assumptions, economic impulses, and
> behavioral
>> standards imposed by democratic thought and current social knowledge.
>> 
>> Optimistic and skillful counseling, built on personal experience with the
>> handicap and its problems, is required to accomplish this delicate work.
>> Under the present program such counseling has not been supplied. On the
>> contrary, too often rehabilitation officers have themselves subscribed to
>> the conviction of the incompetence of the blind. Little has been done
> under
>> the present program to halt the tendency of shunting the disabled into a
>> limited series of stereotyped occupations, to provide a staff which will
>> have and exhibit full confidence in the blind, and which will aid the
> blind
>> to enter fields of their own choosing. Little has been done under the
>> present program to strengthen placement as an inescapable function of the
>> rehabilitation agency. For the blind this is the arduous culmination of a
>> long and arduous process. It cannot be accomplished by automatic referral
> to
>> employers. It can only be accomplished by the application of highly
>> specialized and individualized techniques of affirmative contact with
>> employers, aggressive seeking of employment opportunities, personal
>> demonstration, and follow-up.
>> 
>> Little is done under the present program to remove the obstructions to
>> employment of the physically handicapped which exist in the public mind,
> in
>> the statutes, ordinances, administrative rulings, judicial decisions, and
>> institutional practices. Above all, the true nature of the handicap and
> the
>> elements which compose it, particularly the social and the psychological
> as
>> distinguished from the physical and medical elements; the proper
functions
>> and goals of rehabilitation; the relationship of disability to
dependency,
>> especially economic dependency; the part presently played and properly to
> be
>> played by public financial aid under social insurance and public
> assistance
>> in the process of rehabilitation; the determinative character of the
>> reintegrative objective and the bearing upon it of liberty, equality,
>> property, and dignity--these basic and urgently pressing questions have
>> never been sufficiently analyzed by the responsible officials in
> vocational
>> rehabilitation.
>> 
>> Until this whole pattern is changed, until a great deal is done to
> reorient
>> the training and functions of rehabilitation workers; to strengthen
> guidance
>> and counseling services; to improve techniques and focus rehabilitation
>> attention on the placement of rehabilitants in competitive employment;
and
>> to remove legal, administrative, and other obstacles to the employment of
>> the blind in the public service, the trades, professions, and common
>> callings of the community--until that happy day, rehabilitation of the
> blind
>> is likely to continue to be measured in inches and not in miles.
>> 
>> Americans are familiar with the unhappy divergence between creed and
> conduct
>> in many phases of our national life. Myrdal's observation of the
disparity
>> between social equality as a cherished political norm and our unequal
>> treatment of the Negro is but one instance of a pattern that is all too
>> pervasive. The field of blind welfare provides another, one which has
been
>> less noticed but is not less conspicuous or significant.
>> 
>> Footnotes
>> 
>> 1. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought 22 (1940).
>> 
>> 2. Sumner, The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays 25 (Keller ed., 1914).
>> 
>> 3. For illustrative statements of this doctrine see Johnson and Graham's
>> Lessee v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat 543,572 (U.S. 1823); Story, Misc. Writings 74
>> (1835); Justice Matthews in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
> Justice
>> Cordozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325,328 (1937); see also
>> Justice Murphy dissenting in Yamashita v. Styer 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946).
>> 
>> 4. Winston Churchill speaking at Fulton, Missouri, March 1946.
>> 
>> 5. Under the general power of the states, often called the "police
power,"
>> wrote Justice Barbour in City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 139 (U.S.
>> 1837), "[I]t is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a
>> state to advance the safety, happiness, and prosperity of its people, and
> to
>> provide for its general welfare. . . ." Said Justice Field in Barbier v.
>> Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884), "[N]either the [Fourteenth]
>> amendment--broad and comprehensive as it is--nor any other amendment, was
>> designed to interfere with the power of that state...to prescribe
>> regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
> order
>> of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
>> state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity."
>> 
>> 6. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U.S. 399 (1923).
>> 
>> 7. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). Justice Hughes there said, "It
>> requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
>> common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the
personal
>> freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the amendment
>> [Fourteenth] to secure."
>> 
>> 8. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
>> 
>> 9. Truax v. Raich, supra note 7; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
> (1897).
>> 
>> 10. Merriam, The New Democracy and the New Despotism 84-85 (1939).
>> 
>> 11. Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull 3 Dall. 386 (1798); Chancellor Kent,
2
>> Kent Comm. 1 (1827).
>> 
>> 12. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66 (1893).
>> 
>> 13. DeTocqueville, Democracy in America 3 (1945 ed.).
>> 
>> 14. tenBroek, Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment (1951).
>> 
>> 15. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
>> 
>> 16. DeSchweinitz, People and Process in Social Security 56-57 (1948).
>> 
>> 
>> 
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