[NAGDU] NFB Vs. Guide Dogs

[d m gina]

If you have this problem I wouldn't get a dog.
I know that I have shortness of breath from time to time.
She is a handful, and no isn't in her thinking when she wishes to do 
what she wants to do.
Cross in front of me to smell pants because they have a puppy, oh that is ok.
Or going out the front door sniffing pants because they have a dog
Or pet me because I am cute.
Yes at this time she is not a joy to work.
I need to call pet smart because I don't know where else to get training.
I need to work with someone how to control her head.
Even in my sleep I am asking questions as
Am I holding my hand in the rite place at my left side, saying heal, 
and what does that mean when I want to be petted.
Trust at this time, I have no trust in this dog.
When going down curbs with a cab driver, it is better to get a pet than 
to watch if I am getting down the curb.
Yes she is no joy to work.
I know Sheila will read this, so take note, she is not joy at all.
Even the collar doesn't matter, because I am going to do what I want 
and that is how it goes.
Yes I share this, because I am not afraid to share what is happening.
Think hard because when I get done with a trip I am so tired, it is unreal.

Original message:
> In the fifties and the sixties, the use of guide dogs was still very young.
> The NFB defended the right of blind people to use dogs, but many of us felt
> that the dog was an inferior mode. I know this because some of the core of
> it was in Iowa. We believed that the cane was the superior method of
> traveling about. Please don't let that start a cane vs. dog discussion
> because that isn't what it means. I'm just stating. There weren't many
> people then who used dogs and also were in the NFB, at least not at
> conventions. When I decided to get a dog in 1989, someone just gasped and
> wondered what had gotten into me, and when I moved back to Iowa someone said
> that I needed to understand that people weren't going to be making over my
> dog. Things have changed a lot over the past 27 years since I got that dog,
> but I sometimes still feel remnants of it here. When I was running for state
> president, it was suggested that a blind person running for state president
> shouldn't be using a dog. So yeah, it has existed, but the NFB itself did
> not ever have a policy against guide dogs.
> I believe I am representing this correctly. Maybe that is part of the reason
> I am struggling with whether or not to get another dog--that and the fact
> that I have shortness of breath.
> Cindy Lou Ray
> cindyray at gmail.com


> -----Original Message-----
> From: NAGDU [mailto:nagdu-bounces at nfbnet.org] On Behalf Of Raul A. Gallegos
> via NAGDU
> Sent: Saturday, December 3, 2016 7:45 AM
> To: NAGDU Mailing List, the National Association of Guide Dog Users
> <nagdu at nfbnet.org>
> Cc: Raul A. Gallegos <raul at raulgallegos.com>
> Subject: Re: [NAGDU] Pros and Cons of Preferential Treatment

> I never understood the perception that the NFB was against guide dogs.
> I've been a part of this organization in some kind of way, shape, or
> form since the early 90s and I've had a guide dog, cane, both, and many
> combinations. Yet, I've never seen that. Not in Colorado, Kansas,
> Indiana, or any other place. If the NFB was against guide dogs, why
> would there be a guide dog division? Why would some of its board of
> directors themselves be guide dog users? I'm not giving you flack, but
> just pondering because I've never gotten that. What I have seen, is many
> from the NFB promote independent travel skills. This means that just
> because you have a guide dog, it doesn't mean you should let your cane
> skills go by the way side. So, maybe that's the perception, I just don't
> know.


> --
> Raul A. Gallegos
> Assistive Technology Trainer

> On 12/3/2016 7:11 AM, Dan Weiner via NAGDU wrote:
>> And being a founder of the NFB he probably wans't too keen on guide dogs,
>> but oh ewell, yes I know I'll get flack for that--lol

>> Still all grousing aside, the article certainly has merit.


>> Dan



>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: NAGDU [mailto:nagdu-bounces at nfbnet.org] On Behalf Of Michael Hingson
>> via NAGDU
>> Sent: Friday, December 02, 2016 11:30 PM
>> To: 'NAGDU Mailing List,the National Association of Guide Dog Users'
>> Cc: Michael Hingson
>> Subject: [NAGDU] Pros and Cons of Preferential Treatment

>> Hi,



>> As you are aware Dr. Jacobus tenBroek was the founder of the National
>> Federation of the Blind in 1940. Yes, others were involved, but Dr.
> tenBroek
>> was the impetus and our best ever blindness philosopher. He was a
>> constitutional law scholar, a good speaker and the author of many speeches
>> and books.



>> The following is a speech delivered by Dr. tenBroek in 1955. This is taken
>> from the Braille Monitor, May, 1996. I believe it is pertinent to our
>> discussions about reasonable accommodation and preferential treatment.
> There
>> is another version of this talk entitled "A Preference For Equality", but
> I
>> was unable to find it.





>> Mike Hingson



>> THE PROS AND CONS OF PREFERENTIAL
>> TREATMENT OF BLIND PERSONS

>> by Jacobus tenBroek

>> An address delivered at the American Association of Workers for the Blind
>> Convention, Quebec, June 1955. First printed in the July 1976, issue of
> the
>> Braille Monitor.

>> The topic of this discussion immediately suggests the ambivalence, if not
>> the outright hostility, aroused in most of us by the idea of preferential
>> treatment. If it implies unwarranted favors and advantages, as it
> sometimes
>> seems to, how is such treatment to be justified with reference to the
> blind
>> or, for that matter, with reference to any group? If the blind are normal,
>> as they claim, why do they need to be treated differently? If their
>> objective is really social equality and integration, is it not true that
>> preferential treatment serves to perpetuate special status, with all its
>> connotations of inequality and inferiority? Is there anything about the
>> problems of the blind or of blindness which makes necessary or desirable
>> some form of preferential treatment?

>> "Any class," wrote one blind man, "which demands special privileges soon
>> finds itself a dependent class," and "the blind of America have developed
> a
>> progressive disease--that of dependency."

>> We espouse the principle, wrote another blind man, "that the blind are
>> normal and competent people, capable of making their own way, on a basis
> of
>> equality." At the same time we ask "special concessions and privileges on
>> the basis that we are helpless and unequal." "We cannot have our cake and
>> eat it too, and such measures and propaganda stressing the inequality of
> the
>> blind are bound to have a most damaging effect upon our primary goal of
>> equality."

>> Let us begin our analysis of the pros and cons of preferential treatment
> of
>> the blind at the beginning: that is, by defining the terms used.

>> Preferential treatment of the blind is treatment which singles out the
> blind
>> for special favors, advantages, or benefits. In short, it is any special
>> treatment. Preferential treatment may be based on an irrational whim,
>> prejudice, or taste--as when one prefers strawberries instead of
>> blueberries, or when it is said "gentlemen prefer blondes." On the other
>> hand, preferential or special treatment may be based on the possession by
>> the group receiving it of some distinctive talents or unique qualities or
>> peculiar needs having a relationship to a proper public policy or socially
>> desirable objective.

>> There are no pros, there are only cons, with regard to the preferential
>> treatment of the blind which is founded in irrational whim, prejudice, or
>> taste; and the blind cannot rightly claim, nor do they generally want,
> mere
>> favoritism, public or private, any more than they claim or want the
>> opposite: discriminatory disadvantage, guilt- or shame-motivated
> rejection,
>> kindness-inspired overprotection, or unthinking exclusion. The pros and
> cons
>> of preferential treatment founded in special qualities or needs of the
> group
>> depend in each individual instance upon three factors: (1) upon a faithful
>> determination and accurate evaluation of the special qualities or needs of
>> the blind; (2) upon a correct appraisal of the public policy or social
>> objective sought to be achieved by the particular preferential treatment;
>> and (3) upon the adaption of means to ends, that is, upon whether the
> means
>> are proper and there is a close and substantial relationship between the
>> special qualities and needs of the blind, on the one hand, and the policy
> or
>> objective, on the other.

>> The other term that must be defined is "the blind." Who are the blind?
> What
>> is blindness?

>> The term blindness in its literal denotative sense means loss of eyesight;
>> the absence of visual acuity. It refers to a strictly physical condition.
>> The blind, then, are simply those who cannot see. Nothing more, nothing
>> less! The term blindness, however, also has a wider connotative sense. In
>> this sense it refers to restricted social and economic contact,
> opportunity,
>> and activity. To be stripped of eyesight is to be shorn of full-fledged
>> membership in society.

>> The difference between the denotative and connotative meanings of
> blindness
>> is exactly that between disability and handicap. Disability refers to a
>> physical deprivation; handicap to the social consequences of that
>> deprivation. The distinction may be seen in the fact that there are many
>> disabilities which carry little or no handicap, such as the chronic
>> laryngitis of Andy Devine, the undersize of jockeys, or the oversize of
>> basketball players. Likewise, there are handicaps with no disability, such
>> as the black skin of American Negroes or the religion of the Jews in Nazi
>> Germany. Disability is properly the concern of medical science. We can do
>> little about the physical fact of blindness except to cure it or live with
>> it. But it is not blindness alone that we live with. We live with other
>> people, which is to say we live in society. It is society which creates
> and
>> imposes the handicap of blindness, for it consists of the misconceptions
> of
>> the sighted about the nature of the physical disability. The principal
>> misconception, the one that embodies and epitomizes all the rest, is that
>> blindness means helplessness--social and economic incapacity; the
>> destruction of the productive powers; the obliteration of the ability to
>> contribute to or benefit from normal community participation; in short,
> the
>> lingering image of the helpless blind man.

>> Three comments about the social handicap of blindness are particularly in
>> order: (1) To place responsibility for it upon the sighted is not to speak
>> in terms of blame or recrimination. Far from it! The misconceptions are
>> sanctioned by a society motivated mainly by benevolence, wishing above all
>> else to be kind and helpful. (2) Wherever, as happens with increasing
>> frequency, an individual blind person breaks through the social barriers,
>> his success is likely to be attributed to his possession of special genius
>> or compensatory powers (either superhuman or supernatural) which leave the
>> overall image of blindness intact. (3) Public attitudes about the blind
>> inevitably become the attitudes of the blind. The blind see themselves as
>> others see them. They accept the public view of their limitations and thus
>> do much to make them a reality.

>> Most people exaggerate the physical and underemphasize the social aspect
> of
>> blindness. Our distinguished and able chairman, Father Carroll, has
> defined
>> blindness in terms of twenty lacks and losses. I am one of Father
> Carroll's
>> numerous admirers. But I admire him more for his willingness to prepare a
>> list than for the list he has prepared. It seems to me that he falls prey
> to
>> the common fallacy. Note what a large percentage of the items on the list
>> refers to the physical fact of blindness and its immediate physical and
>> personal consequences; what a small percentage refers to the broadly
> social.
>> What may be known hereafter as Father Carroll's Lacks and Losses reads as
>> follows: (1) loss of physical integrity; (2) loss of confidence in the
>> remaining senses; (3) loss of reality contact; (4) loss of visual
>> background; (5) loss of "light"; (6) loss of mobility; (7) loss of visual
>> perception: beautiful; (8) loss of visual perception: pleasurable; (9)
> loss
>> of ease of written communication; (10) loss of ease of spoken
> communication;
>> (11) loss of means for informational progress; (12) loss of recreation;
> (13)
>> loss of technique, daily living; (14) loss of career: vocation, goal, job
>> opportunity; (15) loss of financial security; (16) loss of personal
>> independence; (17) loss of social adequacy; (18) loss of obscurity,
>> anonymity; (19) loss of self-esteem; (20) loss of total personality
>> organization.

>> I would not have you believe that I underassess the importance of the
>> physical disability. Without sight the range of perception is narrowed.
>> Objects which can be seen from afar must be near at hand to be discernible
>> by other senses. And the blind person who has not scuffed his shins on
>> low-lying implements and toys carelessly left on the sidewalk or stumbled
>> over a curb, or bumped his head on an overhanging awning or branch has
> never
>> left his armchair. These are undeniably embarrassing or uncomfortable
>> experiences; but they are properly to be classified as minor annoyances or
>> distractive nuisances, like shaving in the morning or removing your glass
>> eyes at night. In my experience, blind people who are willing to move and
>> put one foot out in front of the other always somehow get where they want
> to
>> go.

>> In any event, the main point is that the real affliction of blindness is
> not
>> the physical disability or its immediate consequences but the social
>> handicap. It therefore becomes most important to analyze the precise
> nature
>> of the handicap. Of what does it consist? What are the elements which
>> compose it? What does it mean to be excluded from society? What are the
>> rights of membership of which the blind are thus deprived?

>> To answer these questions, one must identify the main features of American
>> society, for it is denial of participation in these which constitutes the
>> handicap of blindness. The process of answering the questions therefore is
>> one of resurveying American social and political thought and
> constitutional
>> ideals, one of restating the principles, doctrines, and concepts that are
>> contained therein.

>> The task of restating American social and political assumptions and goals
> is
>> complicated by a number of facts and factors. Major American social and
>> political principles, such as the dignity of the individual, liberty,
>> equality, and private property, are so intermingled and overlapping that
> it
>> is difficult to separate any one of them for single treatment.

>> Emphasis on the various elements has shifted at different periods in our
>> history, in the documents which have embodied and expressed different
>> movements, forces, and times, and among the prominent political writers
> and
>> speakers. Equality was the dominant note in the Declaration of
> Independence.
>> Property assumed relatively a stronger position in the Constitution.
> During
>> the nineteenth century, when fortune and geography gave the nation
> military
>> safety and free land and the open frontier gave individuals a sense of
>> economic safety, security was assumed and liberty was elevated into a
>> primary position. Today, as Ralph Henry Gabriel writes, "When the
>> traditional foundations of culture crumble,...when government by law gives
>> way to government by irresponsible force, the preoccupation with liberty
> as
>> an end in itself is replaced by a new search for security, mental, social,
>> economic, and even physical."1

>> Sometimes, indeed, going far beyond mere shifts in emphasis, the elements
>> are presented as irreconcilably contradictory. Read for example this
> passage
>> from William Graham Sumner: "Let it be understood that we cannot go
> outside
>> this alternative: liberty, inequality, survival of the fittest;
> non-liberty,
>> equality, survival of the unfittest. The former carries society upwards
> and
>> favors all of its best members; the latter carries society downwards and
>> favors all its worst members."2

>> Finally, the task of stating American social and political principles is
>> made difficult by the fact that they are not fixed and immutable, as the
>> laws of the Medes and the Persians were reputed to be. To the extent that
>> they are a living reality in a developing democracy, they are constantly
>> growing, maturing, and changing. Every generation, every decade is a
>> formative period in the constitutional life of the nation. In our
> generation
>> the creative interpretation and application of American social and
> political
>> principles in the sphere of international organization and in the social
> and
>> economic sphere are in process.

>> Yet, despite these difficulties in stating them, the major elements in the
>> set of widely accepted and persistently enduring political principles and
>> social ethics are identifiable and subject to description and
>> characterization. The "easily remembered" formulations can be found in the
>> landmark documents of our history. These documents not only express and
>> embody movements and periods of the past but are as well basic forces of
>> government in the present and for the future. They include the Declaration
>> of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, the Preamble to the United
> States
>> Constitution, the state constitutions, the Civil War amendments to the
>> United States Constitution, and the more famous pronouncements of the
> United
>> States Supreme Court.

>> (1) Liberty. In American political thought, liberty has many aspects and
>> sources. It is both positive and negative. It is political, economic,
>> personal, and, in a broad sense, social. It is founded by some in
>> positivism; by others in natural law; by still others in moral law. It
> sets
>> in equilibrium constitutionalism and democracy. In part liberty consists
> in
>> protection against the will of the majority, no matter how regularly
>> manifested and how lacking in oppressiveness or arbitrariness. In this
>> aspect it is embodied in an array of restraints on governmental action and
>> the organized power of society. The existence of a constitutionally
> arranged
>> governmental structure and distribution of powers, in fact the existence
> of
>> a constitution at all, implies a system of limited government.

>> The Constitution, too, contains many explicit prohibitions on government.
>> Though some exist elsewhere in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and
> the
>> other amendments are, of course, a catalogue of these. Among them are the
>> protection given life, liberty, and property, the requirement of
> established
>> and regular procedures by government, and the guarantee of immunity from
>> unreasonable intrusions into the privacy of one's person, house, papers,
> and
>> effects. The many safeguards against improper conviction for crime refer
> not
>> only to the technical aspects of criminal justice, but bespeak the basic
>> right of personal freedom: i.e., freedom to move about as one pleases and
> to
>> be not subject to surveillance and custodialization by the agents of the
>> state. Likewise, freedom from slavery and peonage is decreed, implying not
>> only self-ownership but free labor and the right to the rewards of labor.

>> A dominant part of American social and political thought has always been a
>> notion that these rights, thus fixed in the Constitution, are the
>> indivestible possessions of individuals even when not so guaranteed.
> Whether
>> derived from natural law, moral law, higher law, or various other concepts
>> about the fundamental nature of man and society, this notion has found
>> constant expression throughout our history. Its standard formulation is in
>> the Declaration of Independence: "[T]hat [men] are endowed by their
> Creator
>> with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and
> the
>> pursuit of happiness." These rights governments were instituted to secure
>> and protect, not to create and confer.3

>> The concept that rights which are regarded as very important are somehow
>> natural rights or derive from a higher law results from a philosophic view
>> which has lost much of its persuasion and support in recent decades. The
>> Founding Fathers, however, and most American statesmen down through the
>> Civil War period, made it their starting point. Natural rights thus became
>> inextricably woven into the fabric of American social and political
> thought
>> and popular belief. They lurk just below the surface of many of our state
>> papers, judicial pronouncements, and political orations of today. Of those
>> Americans who do not accept this particular philosophical concept, most
>> still insist upon the great importance and basic character of the rights
>> proclaimed.

>> So far I have spoken of the constitutional side of constitutional
> democracy.
>> The democracy side is a positive aspect of liberty. It has to do with the
>> individual's right to participate in government, in the determination of
>> social direction and policy. Its foundation is the doctrine of popular
>> sovereignty and the consent of the governed. Its implementations are the
>> right of suffrage, the right to seek and hold office, and the right of the
>> majority to rule. Its indispensable conditions are freedom of speech,
> press,
>> and assembly.4

>> Liberty is positive in another phase besides that of the co-sovereignty of
>> citizens of a republic. Government is responsible for the protection of
> the
>> rights of the individual. This cannot be wholly achieved by the government
>> itself refraining from invading them. It must prevent others from invading
>> them. It must eliminate and control the conditions which nullify them or
>> make their exercise impossible. It must foster, promote, establish, and
>> maintain the conditions which nullify them or make their exercise
>> impossible. It must foster, promote, establish, and maintain the
> conditions
>> which make their exercise possible and significant. This is especially
> true
>> if the right is active rather than passive; if it involves doing and not
>> just being; acquiring and not just having; speaking and not just
> listening.
>> Congress, as Webster declared in his famous debate with Hayne, is under an
>> obligation to exercise the powers delegated to it in the Constitution for
>> the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth in the Preamble of the
>> Constitution--to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide
>> for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
>> blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. . . ."5

>> Men have a right to life, personal freedom, and personal security. They
> have
>> the right to marry, have and rear children, and maintain a home.6 They
> have
>> a right, so far as government can assure it, to that fair opportunity to
>> earn a livelihood which will make these other rights possible and
>> significant.7 Men may not be bound to the place of their poverty and
>> misfortune; they may move freely about the country in search of new
>> opportunity.8 They have a right freely to choose their fields of endeavor,
>> unhindered by arbitrary, artificial, and man-made impediments.9 They have
> a
>> right to enter the common trades, callings, and occupations of the
>> community. They have the right, if they are free, to manage their own
>> affairs as they see fit, unless and until there is interference with the
>> equal rights of others to manage their affairs or there is injury to the
>> welfare of the community.

>> "It is not enough," wrote the President's Committee on Civil Rights in
> 1947,
>> "that full and equal membership in society entitles the individual to an
>> equal voice in the control of his government; it must also give him the
>> right to enjoy the benefits of society and to contribute to its progress.
> .
>> . . Without this equality of opportunity, the individual is deprived of
> the
>> chance to develop his potentialities and to share the fruits of society.
> The
>> group also suffers through the loss of the contributions which might have
>> been made by persons excluded from the main channels of social and
> economic
>> activity."

>> (2) The Dignity of Man. Deeply imbedded in this concept of liberty is a
>> democratic view of the individual, of his role in society, relation to the
>> state, essential dignity and worth. It is the individual who possesses
>> rights which are fundamental and inalienable. He is at the beginning and
> the
>> end of the state. He organizes it and gives it authority. Its powers are
>> conferred to protect his rights and to assure the conditions necessary for
>> their maximum expression. The state exists for his benefit, not he for
> its.
>> "In democratic society," wrote Charles Merriam, "regard for the dignity of
>> man stands behind the throne of public order, a constant reminder of the
>> need for liberty and justice as well as order, a constant plea that the
>> human personality shall not be forgotten in the multiplications of laws,
> in
>> the ramifications of administration, or in the antiquarianism of formal
>> justice."10

>> Democracy breathes respect for all men and seeks to preserve their
>> individuality and autonomy. This spirit is violated wherever men are
>> alienated or sheltered from the mainstream, not only in the overt gestures
>> of rejection but in the sentimental embrace of patronage and protection.
>> Humanity is degraded and individuality disparaged by treatment of the
> person
>> as a unit in a category determined by irrelevant traits, defined and
>> measured not in unique terms of personal character and achievement but in
>> the stereotype terms of physical or national or racial difference.

>> (3) The Rights of Property and to Contract. The rights to property and to
>> contract have likewise been regarded as fundamental in the American
> system.
>> The right to property along with life and liberty is listed as one of the
>> three great rights of all free men in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta. It
>> appears thus also in the American state constitutions, early and late, in
>> the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in the United States Constitution,
>> Amendments V and XIV, and elsewhere.11

>> The rights to liberty, property, and contract are interlocking if not
>> interchangeable concepts. The right to contract is sometimes stated as an
>> incident to the right to property; sometimes as an independent aspect of
>> liberty. Property is described by some as sufficiently broad to
> incorporate
>> all other rights of individuals, including liberty; and liberty is often
>> regarded by others as broad enough to encompass the right to acquire, use,
>> and enjoy property. The three rights of liberty, property, and contract
> are
>> thus intimately associated in American thinking.12

>> Property and contract rights are not unlimited but, on the contrary, are
>> subject to public control in the public interest. They may be abridged
> and,
>> in some cases, destroyed altogether, if that is necessary to protect the
>> community against injury or danger in any form, against fraud or vice or
>> economic oppression or serious public inconvenience or depression or other
>> disasters. The power to control is coextensive with the social and
> economic
>> activities of men. It finds its limit in the nature of the acts forbidden
> or
>> required and its justification in the direct relation of these acts to the
>> public welfare or to the equal property rights of others.

>> The power of the state over property and contract rights, however, is not
>> merely negative or incidental to the power to legislate for the health,
>> safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. The basic character
> of
>> the right and the purpose of government regarding it cannot be minimized
> or
>> ignored. That purpose, as in the case of liberty, is to protect and
>> preserve, maintain, and nurture the right. The power to regulate the use
> of
>> property and contract, consequently, may not, save in very rare and
> special
>> circumstances, be converted into the power directly to take property and
>> contract rights. And in discharging its primary and affirmative duty with
>> respect to these rights, the state must keep constantly in view the
>> essential values of private property in our system. It is a central factor
>> in the organization of society. It is an impelling source of motivation.
> It
>> is a principal incentive for productive activity. It is a reward for labor
>> and contribution. It is at once the object of individual enterprise and
>> success and the means of achieving success. And contract is the form of
>> expression and governing instrument, not only of most business activity,
> but
>> as well of most of the transactions of daily life.

>> (4) Equality. Only second to liberty itself in our history has been the
>> ideal of equality. In fact, equality has always conditioned liberty and
>> determined its character just as liberty has always conditioned equality
> and
>> determined its character. In the Declaration of Independence, the first of
>> the "self-evident truths" is that all men are created equal; and all men
> are
>> equally "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights," "among
>> which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

>> Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1835, described equality in America as "the
>> fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived and the central
>> point at which all my observations constantly terminated." In his view it
>> gave "a peculiar direction to public opinion and peculiar tenor to the
> laws;
>> it imparts new maxims to the governing authorities and peculiar habits to
>> the governed." It "extends far beyond the political character and the laws
>> of the country, and...has no less effect on civil society than on the
>> government; it creates opinions, gives birth to new sentiments, founds
> novel
>> customs, and modifies whatever it does not produce."13

>> Equality, even more than liberty, stood in the forefront of the historic
>> struggle in the nation to abolish property in man and the institution of
>> slavery; and, along with liberty, emerged in the Civil War amendments to
> the
>> Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment, freeing men from slavery and
>> nationalizing the right of freedom, nationally guaranteed what slavery
>> denied: the equal right of all to enjoy protection in those natural rights
>> which constitute freedom. The Fourteenth Amendment, in the three redundant
>> clauses of Section 1, re-embodied these same objectives and added an
>> explicit guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, thereby adding
>> another confirmatory reference to the self-evident truth that all men are
>> created equal and are equally entitled to the protection of government in
>> the enjoyment of their natural and inalienable rights.14

>> Like liberty, equality has many phases. One of them relates to the
> doctrine
>> of proper classification. The laws must be aimed at the achievement of a
>> public and constitutional purpose. They may not be motivated by hatred,
>> vengeance, favoritism, or private gain. Legislation framed with a
>> discriminatory purpose, manifesting "an evil eye and an unequal hand,"
>> contains an elementary antagonism to the idea of the equality of men. Once
>> legislation is endowed with a public and constitutional purpose, it still
>> must meet other tests. Because there are real differences among men,
>> regulation would be altogether ineffective if it had to apply to all or
>> none. The law must therefore be selective. But to be equal, it must treat
>> all those similarly situated alike. The differences between men that
>> underlie selection must be real differences and must bear an intimate
>> relationship to the purpose of the law and valid social goals. All other
>> differences are irrelevant and must be ignored. "Class Legislation," said
>> Justice Field in summing up this doctrine, "discriminating against some
> and
>> favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a
>> public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its
>> operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within
> the
>> amendment."15

>> Another phase of the idea of equality is the rule of law. If all men are
>> created equal and equally possess certain rights, and if governments are
>> instituted to secure and maintain those rights, and men therefore are
>> equally entitled to such protection, the protection can only be afforded
> by
>> uniform rule, that is, by law. One way of putting this is the expression:
>> "Equality before the Law." Another way is in the celebrated words of the
>> Massachusetts Bill of Rights: "That the government of the Commonwealth may
>> be a government of laws and not of men." Thus, in this aspect, the
> doctrine
>> of equality is in effect a command that the government act by established
>> and regular procedures and by uniform rules. It is a command that the
> purely
>> personal, arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical be reduced and eliminated
>> from the exercise of power. It is a command that the rules be fixed and
>> announced in advance in a way which will make them freely and publicly
>> available. It is a requirement of a degree of certainty and predictability
>> in government action and of a system of rights growing out of uniform
> rules.
>> It is finally an order that administrators as well as legislators act
> within
>> these confines.

>> In still another phase, equality is not negative and procedural but
> positive
>> and substantial. Anatole France referred to "the majestic equality of the
>> laws which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg
> in
>> the streets, and to steal their bread." But the demands of equality are
> not
>> met by the equal treatment which results from the absence of the laws or
>> from the indiscriminate application of the laws to those who are
>> dissimilarly situated. Moreover, the demands of equality are not exhausted
>> by the doctrine of classification and the rule of law. The equal
> protection
>> of the laws refers to the quality of the laws as well as to the mechanics
> of
>> their operation. The reign of equal laws involves as well the reign of
> just
>> laws, and the maintenance of equality in the enjoyment of rights is at the
>> heart of the system of justice. Equality thus must be the very purpose of
>> governmental action and policy as well as a test and measure of its means.
>> It must "give direction to public opinions," determine the "tenor of the
>> laws," impart "maxims to the governing authorities," and modify "whatever
> it
>> does not produce."

>> Particularly is the government under a duty to guarantee equality of
>> opportunity. Without that, freedom itself cannot last and becomes an
>> illusion. The only aristocracy that a system founded upon equality can
>> tolerate is an aristocracy of personal merit and achievement. Uniformity
> and
>> regimentation, on the one hand, and status, influence, and power based on
>> birth, social position, or inheritance, on the other hand, are equally
>> incompatible with equality. Equality of all men presupposes respect for
> the
>> rights of others. In a society of equals, therefore, men are free to be
>> different. All limitations on opportunity, all restrictions on the
>> individual based on irrelevant differences of race, color, religion,
>> national origin, sex, and the like, are in conflict with equality and must
>> be removed and forbidden. Access to the mainstreams of community life, the
>> aspirations and achievements of each member of society, are to be limited
>> only by the skills, energy, talents, and ability he brings to the
>> opportunities equally open to all Americans.

>> From what I have said so far, a number of propositions emerge:

>> (1) Preferential treatment of the blind based on favoritism, privilege,
>> whim, prejudice, patronage, pity, charity, self-interest of others, or
>> feelings of like or dislike cannot be justified and indeed does a great
> deal
>> of harm. On the other hand, preferential treatment which takes account of
>> the special qualities or needs of the blind or aspects of their situation
>> not shared by others, which is aimed at a desirable social objective and
>> which employs proper means properly adapted to this purpose, is not only
>> justifiable preferential treatment but is treatment which should be at the
>> foundation of all public and private policy toward the blind.

>> (2) Blindness has a dual aspect: the physical and the social. The first is
>> the disability; the second is the handicap. Treatment of the disability is
> a
>> medical task. Overcoming the handicap is the function of rehabilitation.

>> (3) The handicap consists mainly of the misconceptions of the sighted
> about
>> the physical disability which result in social exclusion. In all but the
>> physical sense, and even to some extent in that, it consists of a loss of
>> full membership in society; a denial to the blind of the rights and goals
>> which others share--liberty, equality, property, dignity.

>> (4) Overcoming the handicap of blindness, therefore, means removing the
>> bars, exclusion, and denials of which the handicap consists: conferring on
>> the blind the title deeds of social freedom and membership; the rights of
>> liberty, equality, property, and dignity; in short, their reintegration
> into
>> society.

>> (5) Programs which address themselves to this purpose or which move in
> this
>> direction, while they necessarily involve preferential treatment, meet all
>> the tests and standards set up for good policy. Such special arrangements
>> might better go by the name of equal treatment. Indeed, to lift from the
>> backs of the blind the special, heavy, and unnecessary burdens which
> society
>> has caused them to bear and to call this preferential treatment can hardly
>> be regarded as anything but the bitterest irony. Programs which move in
> the
>> opposite direction, which accept and build upon the public misconceptions
>> about the nature of the physical disability, which presuppose the
> incapacity
>> and abnormality of the blind, and which institutionalize that
> presupposition
>> in segregation and custodialization--all programs, in other words, which
>> continue or intensify social exclusion or which are motivated by
> patronage,
>> charity, whim, prejudice, or self-interest--involve preferential or
> special
>> treatment which increases the handicap. They perpetuate the very attitudes
>> and conditions which they should be designed to prevent.

>> (6) Preferential treatment is also justified which: (a) tends to
> ameliorate
>> the immediate physical consequences of the physical disability of
> blindness;
>> or (b) pending the day when integration has been achieved, mitigates the
>> financial and other consequences of social exclusion or offsets the
>> disadvantage resulting therefrom by means which do not further entrench
> the
>> public misconception or which do so as little as possible.

>> (7) To be consistent with the standards dictated by the basic principles
> of
>> our social, political, and constitutional system, programs for the blind
>> must:

>> (a) Allow the blind to manage their own personal affairs and proceed on
> the
>> assumption that they are capable of doing so.

>> (b) Not only permit the blind, but stimulate and encourage them to develop
>> their potentialities, share in the fruits of society, and contribute to
> its
>> work and progress.

>> (c) And to do this, not only permit, but stimulate and encourage the blind
>> to work, to engage in individual enterprise, to exercise free judgment and
>> free movement in the search for opportunity, freely to choose their fields
>> of endeavor and to enter the common callings, trades, occupations, and
>> professions of the community.

>> (d) To stimulate and encourage the blind to do these things by relying on
>> the normal incentives, principal among which are financial remuneration
> and
>> the improvement of one's economic lot and social status.

>> (e) Permit, stimulate, and encourage the blind to acquire, enjoy, and use
>> property (real and personal), not just for immediate consumption purposes,
>> but as a motivational source of endeavor and a means of economic
>> improvement.

>> (f) Protect the essential dignity of the individual: by recognizing the
>> worth of the human personality and treating it as a community asset rather
>> than a community liability; by supplying aids and services without
>> humiliation, without undue intrusion into the privacy of the recipient,
>> without imposing upon him the badges and indicia of a needy and special
>> status, without subjecting him to the personal judgments of social workers
>> influenced by humanity, charity, approval, or other emotions; by making
>> possible a standard and circumstance of living not conspicuously different
>> from that enjoyed by the rest of the community; by leaving recipients free
>> to make their own decisions as to spending, living arrangements, and
>> personal matters.

>> (g) If the demands of equality are to be met, public financial aid must be
>> granted as a matter of right, the element of personal discretion exercised
>> by administrators and welfare workers must be eliminated, the amount and
>> conditions of the aid must be specified in uniform rules made accessible
> to
>> recipients and prospective recipients and sufficiently exact so that
>> recipients may determine to what they are entitled and what their
>> responsibilities are. Legislative and administrative standards must be
>> established which are uniformly applied, which treat all welfare
> recipients
>> alike who are similarly situated with respect to a valid purpose of the
>> welfare law, and which vary the amount and the condition of the grant when
>> there are real differences among recipients in terms of their relationship
>> to the welfare program. Finally, equality requires--as does liberty, the
>> dignity of the individual, and the essential notion of property--that the
>> purpose of the welfare law be opportunity as well as security. Relief
> rolls
>> should provide relief; but they must also provide the means of escape from
>> them. Reintegration into society through open and equal access to the
>> mainstream of community productive activity must be an object of welfare
> law
>> and a measure of its adaptation if the fundamental political and
>> constitutional principles of our system are to be honored in the fact as
>> well as held out in the promise.

>> Measured by these standards, evaluated in the light of these
> considerations,
>> how do our programs and provisions for the blind prove out? The answer
> must
>> be mixed. Some programs are well adapted to these principles; others
> poorly;
>> and still others are in flat contradiction of them. Unfortunately, some of
>> the most important programs fall into the latter two categories.

>> The rapidly growing and recently created system of orientation and
>> adjustment centers--focusing on mobility training, personal care,
>> prevocational manual skills, and the development of attitudes which make
>> these other activities possible and fruitful--are properly oriented and
>> adjusted to reduce the immediate physical consequences of the disability
> of
>> blindness, to uproot the conviction of incompetence, and to impart
>> self-confidence, hope, and a zest for living.

>> The home teacher system, though hampered by the need to deal with the
> blind
>> person in his home and then only in occasional short visits, substantially
>> moves in the same direction as the orientation center. It is most
> effective
>> when used as a case-finder for the center and otherwise works in close
>> collaboration with it. It is least effective when it emphasizes handicraft
>> as mere busy work or when it teaches Braille to clients who will never
> have
>> any use for it.

>> White cane laws, now enacted in almost all the states, by giving the blind
> a
>> legal position in traffic and moderating the discriminatory harshness of
> the
>> contributory negligence rule, make meaningful for the blind the human and
>> constitutional right of free movement, just as the cane itself makes more
>> meaningful the physical capacity of free movement.

>> What about good vision requirements established in many laws and
> regulations
>> dealing with jobs, licenses, and the like? Some of these are, of course,
>> perfectly in order. Where sight is indispensable to the performance of the
>> task- -as in hunting with a gun, driving a truck, or working as a
>> photographer of wildlife for the National Park Service--the blind are
>> legitimately excluded. Where sight is not indispensable, as is the case in
>> thousands of jobs public and private from which the blind are now
>> barred--the continued exclusion of the blind can have no special
>> justification. In many of these cases the bars remain up because those who
>> tend them have only their misconceptions to guide them.

>> Laws and regulations giving preference to blind persons with respect to
> jobs
>> are not mere favoritism if they are based on the special qualifications of
>> the blind to perform the tasks assigned. This is clearly so when the blind
>> are called upon to work in or administer programs affecting the blind. In
>> that circumstance blindness is an enabling asset endowing the worker with
>> special knowledge, experience, and the confidence of his clients which
>> probably cannot be secured in any other way than by being blind. Of course
>> this enabling asset should be given determinative weight only when other
>> things are equal. For the blind to be given preference in other situations
>> in which blindness does not contribute to the ability to do the work would
>> be as unjustifiable as to discriminate against the blind in jobs in which
>> blindness does not detract from the ability to do the work.

>> What about vending stands for which the blind are given rent-free
> locations
>> on public property, in connection with the establishment of which they are
>> given a preference and protection against vending machine competition, and
>> with respect to the operation of which blindness is not an enabling asset?
>> These special arrangements will not withstand merited criticism once the
>> blind have achieved a footing of complete economic equality. Until that
> time
>> arrives, however, the vending stand program is preferential treatment
> which
>> is justified as a small offset to almost universal economic discrimination
>> against the blind; and one in which bona fide jobs are provided for
>> qualified blind workers at comparatively negligible cost to the public;
> and
>> one in which the blind are presented to the public in an aspect of
>> competence and normality.

>> If the management of the vending stand programs is to be consistent with
> the
>> standards above discussed, it must keep supervision and control at an
>> absolute minimum; allow the operator to purchase his stand and equipment
>> with only an option to repurchase by the public; give the operator
> complete
>> independence in the management of his business affairs, retaining only the
>> power to revoke the license if the operator proves incompetent or becomes
>> publicly obnoxious; protect the operator's profits against confiscation
> for
>> the support of supervisory personnel or submarginal stands which the
>> administrators have mistakenly established in unprofitable locations. The
>> control system, on the contrary, reflects the custodial attitude toward
> the
>> role and the abilities of the blind, a conviction that the blind are
>> incapable of running their own business and incompetent to lead their own
>> lives.

>> Let us turn next to public assistance. Liberty in the direction of one's
>> affairs, the whole basic principle of self-management, is violated by the
>> means test. Under it, the individual recipient soon loses control of his
>> daily activities and the whole course and direction of his life. The
>> capacity for self-direction presently atrophies and drops away. With each
>> new item budgeted or eliminated, with each new resource tracked down and
>> evaluated, the social worker's influence increases. This is an inevitable
>> concomitant of the means test. It results from the nature and extent of
> the
>> system. It is bred and nourished by the provisions of the statutes and the
>> rules issued under them. It is in the flexible joints of the cumbersome
>> machinery. It is in the detail and intimacy of the investigation. It is in
>> the inescapable confinements of the budget. It is in the idleness,
>> defeatism, and waning spirit of the recipient. Whatever the social
> worker's
>> wishes and intentions, her hand becomes the agency of direction in his
>> affairs. The "concern of assistance with the whole range of income," wrote
>> Karl DeSchweinitz, "always contains a threat to the freedom of the
>> individual. Even when there is no conscious intent to dictate behavior to
>> the beneficiary, the pervasive power of money dispensed under the means
> test
>> may cause the slightest suggestion to have the effects of compulsion.
> `Whose
>> bread I eat, his song I sing.'"16

>> Not only is liberty violated by the means test, but so also are dignity
> and
>> equality--and for many of the same reasons. Dignity is jeopardized by the
>> initial financial investigation; by the searching inquiry into every
>> intimate detail of need, living habits, family relations; by the setting
> up
>> of a detailed budget of expenditures subject to repeated examination and
>> review; by the continuously implied and often explicit threat that if
>> behavior is uncooperative or unapproved, aid will be reduced or stopped,
> by
>> the wholesale substitution of agency and social worker controls for the
>> personal direction of personal affairs; by the unwarrantable intrusions
> into
>> privacy involved in each of the foregoing and the galling humiliation of
> the
>> whole process; and, finally, by the constant tendency of the whole system
> to
>> push living standards down below a minimum of decency and health.

>> The excessive individualization of the whole design and process of means
>> test aid is fundamentally antithetical to the idea of equality. A system
>> which makes so much depend upon a minute examination of every aspect of
> the
>> individual's situation necessarily involves personalized judgments by
>> officials and invites arbitrary and whimsical exercises of power, prevents
>> the enforcement of a uniform rule even when the legislative provisions and
>> administrative regulations are detailed and exact, renders it impossible
> for
>> the recipient himself to determine to what he is entitled, constitutes the
>> very thing intended to be prevented by the idea of "a government of laws
> and
>> not of men," and flies in the face of basic requirements of proper
>> classification. Since with respect to the purposes of public assistance
> law
>> most individuals are parts of groups standing in the same relationship,
>> those who are similarly situated are not treated alike and real
> differences
>> are frequently disregarded.

>> Means test aid also violates the notion of individual opportunity, access
> to
>> the mainstream of community productive activity, and normal incentives.
>> Since means test aid requires that all income and resources of the
> recipient
>> be applied to meet his current needs and since the public assistance grant
>> is reduced by the amount of any such available income or resources, the
>> usual financial motive for effort and endeavor is removed from the
> recipient
>> unless the recipient can gain enough and with sufficient certainty to be
>> independent of the relief rolls.

>> Granting aid as a matter of right contradicts practically all of the
>> tendencies inherent in the means test and produces a system more consonant
>> with the political and constitutional assumptions and goals of American
>> democracy.

>> Aid as a matter of right requires the establishment of fixed and uniform
>> rules specifying the terms and conditions of the grant. Thus the principal
>> features of the system must be laid down by the legislature. This
> contrasts
>> with the means test variable grant, based on individual need individually
>> determined by the administrative agency under discretionary authority
>> conferred by the legislature. Those who are similarly situated are
> therefore
>> necessarily treated alike and under standards comparable with those
>> governing assistance to other groups in the community.

>> Granting aid as a matter of right protects the liberty of the individual
> to
>> manage his own affairs and conduct his daily life free of authoritarian
>> controls and caseworker supervision. It protects the dignity of the
>> individual. He is treated as a member of a class entitled to be dealt with
>> in a manner determined by law, not by individualized administrative
>> discretion. The occasion is eliminated for invasion of the individual's
>> privacy, supervision of his personal behavior, and humiliating probing
> into
>> the intimacies of his life; and a seminal principle is established which
>> stands as a barrier to all such actions.

>> Finally, rehabilitation. The primary task of vocational rehabilitation, as
> I
>> have said, is the overcoming of the social handicap--not the physical
>> condition. It consists in the creation of an environment within society,
>> within public programs, and within the blind themselves, which will be in
>> the fullest sense conducive to normal livelihood and normal life. It
>> involves opening up the channels of social participation, that is,
> enabling
>> the blind to enjoy the benefits of socially determined standards of
> liberty,
>> equality, property, and dignity. Its time-tested tools are vocational
>> orientation, vocational training, counseling, and guidance which
> stimulates
>> and opens up horizons--and finally, of course, placement in remunerative
>> employment in the common callings, trades, pursuits, and professions of
> the
>> community.

>> In the proper conceptions of its function as well as in the use of these
>> time-tested tools, the vocational rehabilitation program of the United
>> States must in large measure be pronounced a failure. The hope and
>> opportunity are to be measured in miles; the actual accomplishment must be
>> measured in inches.

>> Rehabilitation so far as the individual rehabilitant is concerned is a
>> complex process in which mental and emotional elements are predominant. It
>> involves myriad adaptations not merely physical in nature but social and
>> psychological. In effect, the entire personality must undergo
>> reconstruction; the blind person's conviction of his own incompetence,
>> accepted from the public misconception, must be uprooted; a rebirth, a new
>> act of creation must be wrought. In this process ambition, hope, and
>> self-reliance are essential ingredients. Consequently, rehabilitation by
> the
>> command of the counselor or submission to his attitudes and preferences or
>> by the coercion which results from conditioning public assistance upon it
> is
>> a contradiction. It is therefore futile. It is as futile as ordering a
>> person to restore his emotional balance while adding to the very factors
>> which cause the unbalance.

>> Since the objective of rehabilitation is restoration to a normal useful
> role
>> in society, the standards of success are in large measure culturally
>> determined. The rehabilitated person, thus, is one for whom the
> assumptions
>> and goals of the community have become as significant as for others, who
> has
>> in fact achieved equal opportunity to enter the calling of his choice, to
>> acquire, use, and dispose of property, to exercise the right of personal
>> independence, and to operate on the other assumptions and principles
> before
>> listed. Just as the habits of freedom are not learned by experiencing
>> slavery, so ambition is not learned by destitution, self-management by
>> authoritarian controls, incentive by denying the hope of gain, or
>> self-respect by second-class citizenship. Rehabilitation by command or
>> coercion cultivates the very traits which frustrate and prevent
>> rehabilitation. A rehabilitation program which continually impresses upon
>> the client a sense of his helplessness and dependency; which enshrouds him
>> in an atmosphere of disbelief, doubt, and defeatism; and which exhibits
>> attitudes of guardianship and custodialism must inevitably sap the fibre
> of
>> self-reliance, undermine hope, deter self-improvement, and destroy the
> very
>> initiative which is indispensable to rehabilitation.

>> Rehabilitation by stimulation, by opening up new horizons, by assisting
> the
>> client in the achievement of goals of his own choice, by incentives
>> carefully planned to encourage productive activity by the expectation of
>> normal rewards--retention of earnings, improvement of standards of living,
>> accumulation of real and personal property--places rehabilitative effort
> in
>> conformity with the political assumptions, economic impulses, and
> behavioral
>> standards imposed by democratic thought and current social knowledge.

>> Optimistic and skillful counseling, built on personal experience with the
>> handicap and its problems, is required to accomplish this delicate work.
>> Under the present program such counseling has not been supplied. On the
>> contrary, too often rehabilitation officers have themselves subscribed to
>> the conviction of the incompetence of the blind. Little has been done
> under
>> the present program to halt the tendency of shunting the disabled into a
>> limited series of stereotyped occupations, to provide a staff which will
>> have and exhibit full confidence in the blind, and which will aid the
> blind
>> to enter fields of their own choosing. Little has been done under the
>> present program to strengthen placement as an inescapable function of the
>> rehabilitation agency. For the blind this is the arduous culmination of a
>> long and arduous process. It cannot be accomplished by automatic referral
> to
>> employers. It can only be accomplished by the application of highly
>> specialized and individualized techniques of affirmative contact with
>> employers, aggressive seeking of employment opportunities, personal
>> demonstration, and follow-up.

>> Little is done under the present program to remove the obstructions to
>> employment of the physically handicapped which exist in the public mind,
> in
>> the statutes, ordinances, administrative rulings, judicial decisions, and
>> institutional practices. Above all, the true nature of the handicap and
> the
>> elements which compose it, particularly the social and the psychological
> as
>> distinguished from the physical and medical elements; the proper functions
>> and goals of rehabilitation; the relationship of disability to dependency,
>> especially economic dependency; the part presently played and properly to
> be
>> played by public financial aid under social insurance and public
> assistance
>> in the process of rehabilitation; the determinative character of the
>> reintegrative objective and the bearing upon it of liberty, equality,
>> property, and dignity--these basic and urgently pressing questions have
>> never been sufficiently analyzed by the responsible officials in
> vocational
>> rehabilitation.

>> Until this whole pattern is changed, until a great deal is done to
> reorient
>> the training and functions of rehabilitation workers; to strengthen
> guidance
>> and counseling services; to improve techniques and focus rehabilitation
>> attention on the placement of rehabilitants in competitive employment; and
>> to remove legal, administrative, and other obstacles to the employment of
>> the blind in the public service, the trades, professions, and common
>> callings of the community--until that happy day, rehabilitation of the
> blind
>> is likely to continue to be measured in inches and not in miles.

>> Americans are familiar with the unhappy divergence between creed and
> conduct
>> in many phases of our national life. Myrdal's observation of the disparity
>> between social equality as a cherished political norm and our unequal
>> treatment of the Negro is but one instance of a pattern that is all too
>> pervasive. The field of blind welfare provides another, one which has been
>> less noticed but is not less conspicuous or significant.

>> Footnotes

>> 1. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought 22 (1940).

>> 2. Sumner, The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays 25 (Keller ed., 1914).

>> 3. For illustrative statements of this doctrine see Johnson and Graham's
>> Lessee v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat 543,572 (U.S. 1823); Story, Misc. Writings 74
>> (1835); Justice Matthews in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
> Justice
>> Cordozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325,328 (1937); see also
>> Justice Murphy dissenting in Yamashita v. Styer 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946).

>> 4. Winston Churchill speaking at Fulton, Missouri, March 1946.

>> 5. Under the general power of the states, often called the "police power,"
>> wrote Justice Barbour in City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 139 (U.S.
>> 1837), "[I]t is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a
>> state to advance the safety, happiness, and prosperity of its people, and
> to
>> provide for its general welfare. . . ." Said Justice Field in Barbier v.
>> Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884), "[N]either the [Fourteenth]
>> amendment--broad and comprehensive as it is--nor any other amendment, was
>> designed to interfere with the power of that state...to prescribe
>> regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
> order
>> of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
>> state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity."

>> 6. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U.S. 399 (1923).

>> 7. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). Justice Hughes there said, "It
>> requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
>> common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
>> freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the amendment
>> [Fourteenth] to secure."

>> 8. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).

>> 9. Truax v. Raich, supra note 7; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
> (1897).

>> 10. Merriam, The New Democracy and the New Despotism 84-85 (1939).

>> 11. Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull 3 Dall. 386 (1798); Chancellor Kent, 2
>> Kent Comm. 1 (1827).

>> 12. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66 (1893).

>> 13. DeTocqueville, Democracy in America 3 (1945 ed.).

>> 14. tenBroek, Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment (1951).

>> 15. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).

>> 16. DeSchweinitz, People and Process in Social Security 56-57 (1948).



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